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Commentary 
THE HIGH PrucE OF llABrrAT PRomcnoN 
Under the new Spedes At Risk Ad, the federal government would compensate landowners 
whose property values are reduced by habitat protection orders. This is a very bad idea. 
STEPAN Woon 
Shortly after the new session of Parliament began in January 2001, the Liberal government introduced a new endangered species bill to replace the one that died with the fall 2000 fed-
eral election. 1 Committee hearings were held through the spring, 
and it was expected that the bill would be reported back to the 
House of Co=ons in early su=er and enacted shortly after-
ward. 
Critics have identified many flaws in the proposed Species at Risk 
Act(SARA), but one alarming feature has been largely overlooked: 
the legislation proposes to compensate landowners if mandatory 
habitat protection orders reduce the value of their land. Such or-
ders would be issued when private stewardship and economic in-
centives fail to protect critical wildlife habitat. As the government 
explained in December 1999: 
If the use of one's land has to be highly restricted by the use of the federal 
habitat safety net to protect species' habitats, then individuals should be able 
to apply for compensation? 
This proposal is found in section 64 of the current bill, which 
authorizes the federal Minister of the Environment to "provide 
compensation to any person for losses suffered as a result of any 
extraordinary impact of the application" of SARA's critical habi-
tat protection provisions. 
Proponents of compensation argue that critical habitat protec-
tion measures imposed by the government might drive already be-
leaguered family farmers and other vulnerable individuals out of 
business and possibly out of house and home.3 Clearly nobody 
wants this result. In addition, proponents argue that American ex-
perience shows that enforcement of endangered species legislation 
without compensation may give landowners a perverse incentive 
to destroy wildlife habitat before it is discovered by the authori-
ties.' This, too, is a result that everyone agrees should be avoided. 
Nonetheless, leaping from these extreme cases to a general rule 
that landowners and possibly holders of timber leases or mineral 
licenses on federal land are entitled to compensation whenever 
habitat protection laws cause them business losses or reduce the 
market value of their land would be unprecedented in Canadian 
law. Moreover it would be unjustified. 
The general rule in Canada is that there must be an actual tak-
ing of property by the state or deprivation of its entire reasonable 
economic value, before a right to compensation is triggered; there 
is generally no right to compensation for laws or government ac-
tions simply because they severely restrict the uses to which prop-
erty may be put, reduce its market value or limit (or even freeze) 
its development.5 A wide range of federal, provincial and munici-
pal laws severely restrict land use, but do not normally give rise 
to a right to compensation: for example, prohibitions on disturb-
ing fish habitat or archaeological sites, restrictions on logging or 
farming in riparian buffer zones, regulation of industrial air and 
water pollution, and municipal zoning by-laws. Under Canadian 
law, property owners do not have a right to be paid to comply with 
validly enacted laws that affect the market value of their property. 6 
Proponents of the compensation proposal argue that govern-
ment regulation that reduces property values may amount to a 
"regulatory taking" of property that must be compensated out of 
taxpayers' wallets. This argument has been used by property rights 
advocates and industry groups in the United States to attack a 
broad range of government measures relating to health, safety, so-
cial welfare and environmental protection. Some courts in the 
United States have used the regulatory takings doctrine to invali-
date, or order compensation for, municipal land-use planning de-
cisions and state and federal measures to protect environmentally 
sensitive areas such as wetlands and endangered species habitat. 
Not surprisingly, the regulatory takings movement has gener-
ated furious controversy in the United States.7 If the status of the 
regulatory takings doctrine is doubtful in a country where private 
property is constitutionally protected against government takings, 
it should be even more so in Canada where we have consciously 
decided against constitutional entrenchment of private property 
rights. Indeed, the "regulatory taking" argument has been raised 
infrequently before Canadian courts and has not met with much 
success.8 
Even the federal government's own expert consultant expressly 
recognizes that the compensation proposal is a radical departure 
from past practice. Noted economist Peter Pearse, in his February 
2001 report on compensation, states very clearly that: 
[T]he courts and governments have historically drawn a distinction between 
expropriation of property, for which compensation is due, and restrictions 
on the use of property for some public purpose, for whjch compensation is 
generally not payable. Restrictions that might be imposed under the Spe-
cies at RiskAct are of this regulatory type, so compensation for them conflicts 
with long established policy in Canada.9 
Strangely, very few voices have been raised in opposition to the 
federal government's compensation proposal. Indeed, some 
prominent conservation groups have refused to condemn the pro-
posal, possibly because they do not fully appreciate its implica-
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If the funds earmarked for compensation 
were redirected to incentives and assistance, 
the resulting benefits to endangered species 
could be substantially enhanced. 
tions. Yet the proposal is highly problematic for several reasons. 
• First, the proposal is the thin end of a very large wedge. H the 
government acknowledges an entitlement to compensation for 
mandatory wildlife habitat protection measures, why not for 
other government measures that affect property values, such as 
mining and forestry regulations, municipal down-zoning, or the 
introduction of controls on agricultural waste such as the manure 
that contaminated Walkerton's drinking water supply with the 
e. colibacteria? Governments have not recognized a right to com-
pensation for such injuries in the past. H they now acknowledge 
a property owner's entitlement to compensation for habitat pro-
tection, it will become increasingly difficult to refuse to compen-
sate these other "injuries." 
• Second, the proposal to compensate landowners reduces land-
owners' incentives to agree to co-operative stewardship arrange-
ments with the government. A guarantee of compensation in the 
event of failure of co-operative arrangements markedly improves 
the landowner's bargaining position. If the unco-operative land-
owner is left as well off after a habitat protection order is issued 
as he or she was before, the incentive to co-operate is reduced 
and the government will have to offer more incentives to achieve 
a negotiated resolution. Unless stewardship incentives equal or 
exceed the anticipated compensation, a rational landowner may 
well refuse to co-operate. Thus the compensation proposal has 
the potential to undermine the very goal of the act: protection 
of endangered species habitat through voluntary stewardship ar-
rangements. 
• Third, the proposal reflects the general view that wildlife habi-
tat protection will usually reduce property values. This view is 
based on a conception of "value" that largely disregards the value 
of things for which there are no markets, such as habitat and 
biodiversity. Moreover it ignores the possibility that restrictions 
on land use may, in fact, iTllTeasethe market value of certain prop-
erties. In fact, land use restrictions created by legal tools like cov-
enants and easements often enhance the value and marketabil-
ity of land by protecting a business from competition, ensuring 
the performance of services beneficial to property owners, or en-
hancing the aesthetic appeal of a property. The same can be said 
of many municipal zoning restrictions: the value of your home 
is increased by the assurance, provided by zoning bylaws, that 
a parking lot, factory or big box store will not be built next door. 
• Fourth, why should the taxpayers compensate individuals or 
businesses for the cost of habitat protection measures when we 
do not compensate other people for similar costs? The role of 
elected representatives is to make decisions that apply generally 
to the electorate. These decisions necessarily benefit some inter-
ests and harm others. That is the business of government. Gov-
ernments regularly enact regulations or issue permits that legally 
authorize industry to release harmful pollutants into the environ-
ment, but they do not generally offer to compensate members 
of the public whose health is thereby harmed or put at risk (al-
though some argue they should; my point is that government 
policy should at least be consistent in this area). If governments 
routinely make decisions that harm some individuals for the 
purported greater good of society, why should property owners 
10 ALTERNATIVES JOURNAL 27:3 Summer 2001 
whose land is designated for habitat protection be singled out for 
favourable treatment? 
• Finally, even if we accept the argument that landowners should 
be compensated with taxpayers' money for reductions in prop-
erty value caused by government action, doesn't it follow that we 
should send them a bill when government action causes the value 
of their property to increase? When governments provide infra-
structure works like a massive sewer main or highway connect-
ing a semi-rural hinterland to an urban metropolis, property val-
ues in the area tend to rise. Governments do not require benefited 
property owners to compensate the taxpayers for this increase in 
value. 
When a government establishes a park or protected area, should 
the neighbouring landowners who benefit from the aesthetic 
beauty of unspoiled nature and the assurance that their gorgeous 
backyard view will not be turned into a subdivision pay for the 
resulting increase in their property value? Conversely, when a 
province dismantles environmental protection regulations in or-
der to signal that it is "open for business," should companies be 
asked to reimburse the public for the benefits reaped from lower 
regulatory compliance costs? There is no principled basis on 
which to compensate owners for the burdens of government ac-
tion, yet allow them to keep the benefits of government action (or 
inaction) as a windfall. 
So what should be done? We should protect farming families 
and other vulnerable parties from genuine hardship occasioned 
by endangered species habitat protection measures without rec-
ognizing a legal principle of compensation for reductions in prop· 
erty or business value due to government action. This could be 
done by offering greater stewardship incentives to landowners 
severely disadvantaged by habitat protection requirements, along 
with technical and financial assistance to switch to alternative land 
uses. H the funds earmarked for compensation were redirected to 
incentives and assistance, the resulting benefits to endangered 
species could be substantially enhanced (in part by avoiding the 
perverse bargaining incentives discussed above). Finally, some 
funds should be set aside to compensate, on an ad hoc basis, land-
owners and their families who suffer severe hardship. But the op· 
erative principle would be avoidance of genuine personal hard-
ship, not compensation for reduced profitability. 
It would be best to remove the compensation principle from the 
act itself, but this may not be possible. Nonetheless, the legislation 
is drafted in such a way that these restrictions could still be 
achieved in the design and implementation of a compensation 
program, and the federal government has hinted that it might be 
open to such ideas.10 
It is odd that there has not been more controversy over this is· 
sue. Before the federal goven'unent puts in place a system to com· 
pensate landowners for the effects of critical habitat protection 
orders, we should consider the serious implications this would 
have for the whole range of public health, safety, welfare and en-
vironmental protection regulation. H we acknowledge a right to 
compensation in this situation, it will not be long before landown-
ers and industry demand compensation every time governments 
tighten environmental protection laws or restrict the development 
of environmentally significant areas. !:'! 
Stepan Wood is an assistant professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, 
York University, Toronto, Ontario. 
NOTES 
1 Bill C-5, an act respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada (first 
reading February 2, 2001 ), available online at: <www.parl.gc.ca/37/ l/ parlbus/ 
chambus/house/bills/government/C-5/C-5_1/C-5_cover-E.htmJ> (accessed April 19, 
2001). The federal government has established a Web site devoted to the SpeciesAt /UsJ:. 
Ac4 <www.cws-scf.ec.gc.ca/sar/main.ht:m>. 
